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Industrial Unrest in Canada : 
A Diagnosis of Récent Expérience 
John H.G. Crispo and 
H.W. Àrrhurs 
To diagnose the récent wave of industrial unrest in 
Canada, it is first of ail necessary to indentify its characte-
ristics. The two major dimensions of this phenomenon 
concern the source of union mïlitancy and its illégal mani-
festations. 
Relations between labour and management in Canada hâve been 
unusually turbulent over the past few years. In an attempt to identify 
the source of this turbulence, and to assess its implications, we hâve 
endeavoured to utilize the dual perspectives of our two disciplines, law 
and industrial relations. While the exercise has proven highly self-
educative, we are obliged to admit that it has not produced définitive 
data or cast-iron conclusions.x 
A Perspective on Industrial Unrest in Canada 
I CRISPO, JOHN H.G., Director, Center I 
Labour-management contact I for Industrial Relations, University of I 
seems to b e the unavoidable by- Toronto, Toronto. 
product of industrialization in a I ARTHURS, H.W., Osgoode Hall Law I 
free sociery. Canada, as might b e | School, York University, Toronto. | 
( 1 ) The reader should be forewarned about the « method of research » which 
underlies much of the material presented in this paper. It began with a number 
of informai discussions with trade union leaders over two years ago. Thèse discus-
sions gave rise to the original outline of the paper : an outline which was used as 
the basis for an oral présentation on numerous occasions before a variety of union, 
management and government groups. On most of thèse occasions, a good deal of 
reaction was engendered. This reaction resulted in the addition of many more 
points to the outline and in the modification of some of those already incorporated 
into it. This process was supplemented by our practical and académie expérience 
in related work over the past several years and by extensive reading around the 
subject. We might dignify our basic approach by terming it « action research » but 
some would even take offence at that. Unorthodox at best, our methodology is 
doubtless subject to serious réservations. This weakness was noted by those who 
reviewed the first draft of this paper. We are indebted to the following individuals 
for this observation and for many other helpful comments : Dean A.W.R. Carrothers, 
Dr. AJ. Craig, Professor A. Kruger, Dr. George Saunders, and Professor S.A. Schiff. 
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expected, has had its share of industrial unrest, the most obvious manifes-
tations of which, at least recently, hâve coincided with period of économie 
prosperity. This is not to suggest that such strife is absent during 
économie downturns, but rather that it then tends to be muted and 
perhaps less intensive. This is to be expected in view of the effect of 
unemployment on union bargaining power and of the effect of reduced 
profits on managements negotiating position. During the late 50's and 
early 60's, for example, much of the conflict which took place was 
engendered by managements détermination to withstand further union 
demands and to retrieve concessions made in the earlier postwar years. 
Laboura progress was not entirely halted during this period of économie 
recession, but it was unable to sustain the record of victories which it 
had enjoyed for most of the postwar period. 
It could be argued that the rising industrial unrest we experienced 
thereafter, at least for the early years of the 60's, was attributable to a 
release of pent-up frustrations over relative union ineffectiveness which 
accumulated during the late 50's. While this may be true in part, as a 
total explanation it reflects an oversimplified view that labour-manage-
ment strife ebbs and flows in response to the phases of the business 
cycle. This school of thought we will return to shortly, but first we 
wish to focus attention on the two features of the présent wave of unrest 
which suggest that its causes are much more complex. 
To begin with, much of this unrest is characterized by militancy 
that is less the product of labour leadership than the spontaneous 
outbreak of rank and file restlessness. As one commentator recently 
noted, « Instead of having to whip their members into a mood militant 
enough to justify their call for a walkout, the union executives hâve 
given the impression of running behind the membership. » In some 
case the rank and file seem to hâve been rebelling as much against the 
«union establishment » as against the «business establishment». 
Indeed, privately, union officiais hâve been known to term some récent 
rank and file behaviour « mob rule », « the tyranny of the mernbership », 
and even worse. And yet, as we will suggest, we may be witnessing 
nothing more sinister than a healthy sign of renewed trade union vitality. 
But however characterized, this shift in the source of union militancy 
adds a new dimension to the industrial relations scène. 
The second feature which is worthy of note is the increased lengths 
to which the labour movement appears willing to go in défiance of law 
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and order. An unusual incidence of illégal strikes and défiance of 
court orders has been a distinctive characteristic of the latest wave of 
labour-management conflict. It would be naive to suggest that law and 
order will ever command the undivided respect of labour and manage-
ment, if only because historically the trade union movement feels that 
it could not hâve secured many of its présent rights without deliberately 
defying légal restraints placed upon it. Accepting the fact, however, 
that disrespect for law is to some extent endémie in labour relations, 
(he présent situation seems to hâve brought the underlying tendency 
to lawlessness to the surface. 
We do, finally, wish to avoid the impression of undue pessimism. 
It is important to place thèse two characteristics of the current industrial 
relations scène in proper perspective. While rank and file militancy 
and lawlessness hâve appeared of la te in an unusually potent combi-
nation, some weight must be given to the view that our présent diffi-
culties may be simply paît of the price of prosperity. Yet even to say 
this is to say something quite disturbing, for it suggests that a free 
society cannot maintain a period of sustained économie advance without 
engendering serious industrial unrest. To the extent that this unrest 
can only be relieved by round after round of generous settlements, the 
problem of maintaining price stability during a period of full employ-
ment can be aggravated. Thus it can be made increasingly difficult to 
achieve thèse two goals, let alone our other économie objectives, at 
one and the same time. 
Of Trade Unionism, Collective Bargaining, 
Labour Law and Lawyers 
It is appropriate at this stage to outline some of the pre-conceived 
notions we bring to bear to our subjeot. In the first place we should 
make clear our views on the rôle of trade unionism and collective bar-
gaining. Quite frankly, our value judgments are basically those which 
are reflected in our présent industrial relations System. Though collec-
tive bargaining may sometimes appear to resuit in a desperate and 
never-ending succession of crises, it is an essential part of industrial 
organization in a free society. This in turn leads us to accept trade 
unionism since it is an indispensable participant in the collective 
bargaining process. 
Sometimes the labour movement is perceived almost exclusively in 
terms of its économie rôle, yet its most critical contribution may weîl 
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lie in other sphères. For example, by its législative eampaigns foi-
social reform, and by private experiments in social security mstituted 
through collective bargaining, the labour movement, pressing from the 
left, acts as one of the many competing interest groups in our pluralistic 
society. In this sensé trade unionism acts as a countervailing power 
in the political as well as in the économie sphère. 
We do not mean to minimize the rôle of trade unionism in our 
collective bargaining process. In this process unions are often viewed 
as « slot machines », disgorging économie benefits to those who invest 
their dues. No less importantly, they act as advocates of démocratie 
values in industry, thereby contributing to the dignity and self respect 
of the worker. Above ail, in both respects, unions through their leaders 
hâve traditionally functioned as « managers of discontent ». Collective 
bargaining dépends on worker discontent as its motive power and utilizes 
the strike as a catalytic safety valve. Normally, union leaders do not 
hâve to seek out worker discontent: employers can usually be counted 
on to supply it. Sometimes, union leaders, as good entrepreneurs, be-
come aware of the need to exploit new markets and attract new clientèle, 
and manufacture discontent. But there are times — this would seem 
to be one — when unions and their leaders appear to be overwhelmed 
by unsolicited opportunities for business. 
Given the fact that we accept collective bargaining and trade 
unionism as legitimate, even vital instruments in our society, what of 
our analysis of the légal framework within which they function ? We 
see law as a technique of securing orderly compliance with society's 
objectives and standards of behaviour. In a totalitarian society, of 
course, law may represent the imposed will of a ruling class; in a demo-
cracy it approximates the social consensus. The first point to be made 
about the rôle of law in industrial relations, then, is that it is neither 
static nor inévitable. As society's view of désirable industrial relations 
policies changes, society has it within its power to change the law. If 
there is a gap between prevailing social attitudes and the law, there is 
no intrinsic reason why it cannot be narrowed. To be sure., the law 
does acquire a vitality of its own, and légal institutions hâve the same 
perverse instinct for survival as other potentially obsolescent institutions. 
But it is unrealistic to either praise or condemn « the law » as a thing 
apart from the social policy which it embodies. 
A basic thème of our contemporary policy, as we hâve noted, is 
the desirability of collective bargaining as a technique of regulating 
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industrial relations, and the legitimacy of the strike as an adjunct of 
the bargaining process. Our labour relations acts advance this policy 
by attempting to ensure the confrontation of reasonably equal labour 
and management power blocs. The right of workers to organize unions 
and to participate in their activities is proclaimed by law; employers 
arc obliged to bargain in good faith with unions; upon the breakdown 
of negotiations, strikes are permitted and strikers are given certain 
limited immunities from reprisai. On the other side, unions also are 
obliged to bargain in good faith, to refrain from striking except in support 
of collective bargaining demands, and to refrain from various forms of 
harassment for the duration of a collective agreement. Civil, criminal 
and administrative remédies are available to force employers and unions 
to conduct collective bargaining and économie warfare according to 
thèse rules which are enshrined in our labour relations acts. 
The éducative function of législation must be emphasized hère, 
perhaps even more than its coercive impact. The very announcement 
of public policy by legislators leads the great majority of citizens — 
vvorkers and employers — to give at least grudging allegiance to the 
statute. Where pockets of résistance remain, techniques of persuasion 
are mobilized to secure voluntary compliance. Conciliators may act 
as catalysts to good faith bargaining; field officers may be sent out by 
labour boards to persuade the parties to abandon unfair labour practices; 
the boards themselves may issue non-punitive déclarations to encourage 
transgressors to cease illégal strikes. Even the sanctions available to 
the boards and to the courts hâve their greatest impact when they are 
used in terrorem to secure an end to illegality, rather than to punish it 
after-the-fact. Only in a tiny fraction of cases are criminal penalties 
actually invoked. 
However, the law is not monolithic. While the labour relations acts 
proclaim a contemporary policy which represents a substantial social 
consensus, the common law jurisprudence of labour relations represents 
an older social consensus, based upon différent views of public policy 
and of the propriety of collective bargaining. The roots of the common 
law doctrines which are used to regulate picketing, boycotts and other 
labour activities, reach back about a century to a time when labour 
organization was characterized as a threat to industrial progress. The 
very act of combination, by employées at least, was considered a civil 
wrong, and activities such as picketing designed to bring économie 
pressure to bear upon the employer were likewise treated as torts. Today 
thèse précédants are still applied by the courts. 
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Thus, to speak of the rôle of « law » is something less than accurate. 
There are diverse, indeed conflicting, strains within the law. The older 
policy favous protection of entrepreneurial activity against union inter-
férence, and the newer policy favours protection of collective bargaining 
against employer hostility. As well, even within each of thèse policies 
there is an internai paradox. In each, the law strikes a délicate balance 
between freedom and order. Common law doctrines place a very high 
premium on order and restrict the freedom of employées to associate, 
assemble, and make public appeals in support of their économie objec-
tives. Thus, « order » in this context means the order of the private 
employment contract whose terms are highly favourable to the party 
with superior bargaining power, normally the employer. The labour 
relations acts, in turn, severely inhibit the freedom of an employer to 
use this superior power to discourage unionization by threats, lockouts 
or dismissals. This restriction of the employées freedom is undertaken, 
again, in the name of order, but in this context, « order » means the 
resolution of économie disputes by a process of collective bargaining. 
Clearly, this kind of « order » may resuit in an imbalance of power in 
favour of one party or the other. 
Since collective bargaining statutes accept as legitimate occasional 
« disorders » of the very types the common law condemns, and since the 
quality of the bargain struck under the two Systems is likely to be very 
différent, labour and management hâve each to some extent acquired 
a vested interest in preserving and expanding that part of the légal 
System which reinforces their power position. Labour relations law, 
then, has become as much a tool of contending groups as an expression 
of social consensus. 
Given this somewhat obscure and self-contradictory légal régime, 
it is not surprising that debate over future légal developments should 
be represented by two polar positions. At the one extrême it could be 
argued that the law should abstain totally from intervention in industrial 
relations; at the other extrême, there is the possibility of an all-embracing 
code which would regulate every significant feature of labour-mana-
gement relations through légal institutions. It is, perhaps, significant 
that few lawyers professionally active in labour relations work are to 
be found in support of either position. 
This brings us, finally, to a brief considération of the current rôle 
of the lawyer in industrial relations. Clearly he is more than a profes-
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sional génie whose awsome skill is placed at the service of whoever rubs 
the légal bottle. It is true that many lawyers hâve contributed to the 
exacerbation of labour-management tensions by violent partisanship; 
their capacity for mischief is part of the folklore of labour relations. 
Since lawyers are skilled in the use of légal techniques, they frequently 
win critical battles before boards and courts, and leave behind a residue 
of resentment. This resentment is directed not only at the law, but at 
those who administer it — judges, board members, and lawyers. But 
lawyers can, and increasingly do, operate in a constructive and créative 
way. Through skill at negotiation, ability to résolve conflict by eons-
tiucting compromises, and instinct for reasoned, rather than arbitrary, 
solutions, lawyers can contribute much to good labour relations. The 
experienced lawyer, particularly, becomes at once tactician and moral 
tutor for his client. He is thus strategically located, if he understands 
the problems, to minimize the antagonisms between labour and mana-
gement, while serving the long-run best interests of his client. 
Against this view of the background of the System, its rules, assump-
tions, and principal participants, we proceed to an examination of the 
présent situation. 
Signs of the Récent* Wave of Industrial Unrest 
To diagnose the récent wave of industrial unrest in Canada, it is 
first of ail necessary to identify its characteristics more fulîy than we 
hâve thus far done. As already indicated, the two major dimensions of 
the phenomenon concern the source of union militancy and its illégal 
manifestations. In addition, there are at least six spécifie features of 
unrest that can be distinguished. 
THE UNSEATING OF LONG-TIME UNION LEADERS 
One of the most significant signs of rank and file restiveness and 
industrial unrest in gênerai is to be found in the turnover of senior 
union officers, particularly in some of the major international unions. 
Normally it is extremely difficult to oust the administration of a major 
labour organization, even when the opposition is itself reasonably highly 
placed within the union. Almost inevitably any radical change must be 
the product of a strong undercurrent of discontent among the members 
at large. Récent élections in such unions as the United Steelworkers of 
America and the International Union of Electrical Workers indicate 
how deeply this undercurrent has run of late in some unions. 
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Admittedly thèse two examples involve international unions anJ 
thus hardly provide compelling proof of tbe attitudes of Canadian union 
raembers. While there has been significant turnover among local union 
leaders in Canada, there is no évidence to indicate that its volume is 
greater than it has been in the past. Several outstanding cases, among 
postal employées, railway workers, and steelworkers, reveal what can 
happen hère when the rank and file becomes disenchanted, but thèse 
may not be indicative of any major trends. More senior union officers 
might be unseated in Canada were it not for the fact that the Canadian 
membership in many international unions does not hâve direct control 
over its own top officers, who are elected as part of a slate at an inter-
national convention. This is particularly true among the railway and 
the building trades unions, where there has been a long-standing reluc-
tance to allow the Canadian membership to elect its own représentatives. 
Yet even in the absence of additional data, discussions with union 
leaders and members, and with industrial relations observers, persuade 
us that union leadership on both sides of the border is being challenged 
more regularly and more effectively today than has been the case for 
years. 
THE FAILURE TO RATIFY COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Perhaps even more noteworthy than the previous feature is the 
refusai of union members to ratify collective agreements negotiated by 
their officers. Except where this can be shown to be a deliberate union 
strategem, such refusais are évidence of the waning power of the union 
hierarchy whose prestige and authority are undermined by répudiation 
of their negotiating « successes ». While no figures are available on 
this phenomenon in Canada, it is striking to note that ratification votes 
were unsuccessful in roughly 10°/o of the case which were handled by 
the Fédéral Médiation and Conciliation Services in the United States 
between mid 1965 and mid 1966. More recently that figure has risen 
to over 15%. Although the proportion of rejections is undoubtedly lower 
in Canada, membership refusai to ratify agreements has been a central 
problem in several major cases, including most notably those in the 
steel, packinghouse and transportation industries. 
WILDCAT STRIKES 
A third sign of unrest has taken the form of « wildcat » strikes which 
are neither called nor condoned by responsible union officers. To be 
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sure, unions hâve sometimes given clandestine support to so-called 
wildcat strikes in order to harrass management as part of their bargain-
ing tactics. But the wildcat strikes to which we refer are authentic, 
spontaneous, rank and file uprisings. They are essentially protest 
démonstrations against the authority of both employer and union. Im-
portant examples of such strikes hâve occurred in the railway, primary 
steel and mining industries. 
INTER-UNION RAIDTNG AND BREAKAWAY MOVEMENTS 
As might be expected from thèse signs of self-assertion by the 
membership, traditional organizational loyalties are weakening and 
disappearing. This is reflected in a rising tendency, more prévalent in 
Canada than in the U.S., to exchange one union for another, through 
individual or en bloc défections. This lias been especially obvious in 
the Province of Québec, where for some years now the Confédération 
of National Trade Unions has provided national and international union 
members with a viable alternative. 
Where no such obvious option has been available, local groups of 
disgruntled workers hâve sometimes chosen to go their own way. Across 
the country from Vancouver to St. John's, amongst ail sorts of workers, 
one finds scattered breakaway and unaffiliated groups. Even within 
that portion of the labour movement which is affiliated to the Canadian 
Labour Congress, there is more of a tendency than in the récent past 
for workers to change unions when they think their position will be 
improved by so doing. 
In gênerai, the point is that workers are no longer content to suffer 
apathetically an inferior calibre of trade union représentation. Instead 
they show relatively little hésitation in shifting their loyalty to a new 
bargaining agent which seems to promise more effective prosecution of 
their interests. 
UNION BREAKTHROUGHS IN NEW SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY 
Just as workers with a history of unionization hâve shown more 
inclination to transfer their loyalties from one union to another, so too 
hâve formerly uninterested workers begun to exhibit their disquiet by 
unionizing for the first time. The new enthusiasm for organization 
among public servants and professional employées is in marked contrast 
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to the cool response unions received in thèse sectors of the (Xîonomy 
only a few years ago. Thèse workers suddenly seem to be deciding 
that they hâve many grievances in common with their unionized coun-
terparts in other sectors of the economy. They appear to be determined 
to make up ovemight for any legacy of disadvantage inherited from 
their unorganized past. 
LOST TIME DUE TO STRIKES 
Lost time due to strikes is the one quantitative measure of labour 
unrest. In 1966 this loss in Canada amounted to over five million man 
days. In absolute terms, this topped the postwar peak of 4,500,000 
man-days lost in strikes in 1946, but relative to the size of the workforce, 
it fell significantly short of that record year. More noteworthy from 
a current point of view is the fact that lost time due to strikes lias, with 
the exception of one year, been rising throughout this décade, While 
1966 may turn out to be a peak year for the 1960's, and while the time 
lost may décline somewhat in this and subséquent years, this fact does 
not diminish the significance of the trend to the end of 1966. 
Diagnosing the Current Wave of Industriel! Unrest 
Acknowledging the risks of generalization, especially when based 
upon fragmentary and impressionistic évidence, we now a/ttempt a 
diagnosis. As académies, no doubt we should prefer the security that 
attaches to the analysis of contemporary events which hâve already 
become history. As innocents abroad in the real world of industrial 
conflict, we cannot resist spéculation — no matter how naive, how 
presumptuous it may seem. View us, if you will, as a pair of intellectual 
Luddites whose disdain for the computer has led us to this last igno-
minious public display of the décline of the académie artisan. 
We will focus on the two most prominent manifestations of the 
current situation which we outlined earlier. First we will examine the 
causes of rank and file militancy and then we will turn to the causes of 
labour défiance of law and order. To begin, however, there is an im-
portant background considération which we feel is of great significance. 
A BACKGROUND FACTOR 
Labour militancy in North America can be viewed as part of the 
pervasive restlessness of this century. In science and art, as in politics 
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and philosophy, this is an âge of new truths. As empires and idéologies 
across the world explode and coalesce, and as mass média give the 
average worker some sensé of involvement in thèse momentous events, 
it is almost inévitable that the excitement of the times will permeate 
every aspect of our lives — including industrial relations. Trade 
imionists, like so many in our society, seem less disposed today to accept 
the status quo. Along with others, they appear to share the view that 
things need not — indeed, should not — remain as they are for very 
long. Unlike some among the impatient, however, trade unionists are 
prepared to resort to concerted action to bring about desired changes. 
In this respect the labour movement resembles other broadly based 
ref orm movements in the world at large. Thus, there is a tendency 
among active trade unionists to identify their struggles with those of 
former colonial countries and the disenfranchised negro. Probably more 
noteworthy is the average worker's vague and inarticulate feeling of 
restlessness. The net effect of ail of thèse forces may be to turn lack 
of respect for leaders and authority of any kind into an ingrained 
characteristic of our time. 
Given this gênerai considération, why rank and file militancy? 
EXPLAINING RANK AND FILE MILITANCY 
In suggesting answer to the question « why rank and file militan-
cy' ? », we do not intend to suggest any particular order of priority. 
Rather, our enumeration of factors is based on a logical framework for 
présentation instead of any relative ranking which we would attach to 
them. 
The Pervasiveness of the Demand for More in 
Our Affluent Society 
It is now so widely recognized that we live in an economy of rising 
expectations that it seems almost trite to mention it. Yet, only this 
characteristic of our time explains the increasingly apparent paradox 
that the more people get the more they want. Potentially even more 
troublesome are the demands which people accumulate when they do 
not get as much « more » as they expect for a period of time. As noted 
earlier, this may hâve been the case during the recession years of the 
late 1950's and early 1960's. 
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To be sure, should we ever flag in our quest for more, marketing 
and advertising experts revive our jaded appetites. Thus, society has 
institutionalized the business of creating discontent, by developing a 
whole new profession whose members miglit best be described as « mer-
chants of discontent ». Of course, it would be naive to suggest that 
our acquisitive instincts would disappear if we were not constantly 
bombarded by hidden and not-so-hidden persuaders. We merely 
point out that middle class mores hâve been accepted by the organized 
worker in his capacity as a consumer, and that consequently middle 
class purchasing power is his immédiate objective in collective bar-
gaining. On this phenomenon we make no moral judgment, but we 
do observe that advertisers may be able to merchandize discontent more 
effectively than unions and their leaders can manage it or employers 
satisfy it. 
Inflation and the Rising Cost of Living 
Very much related to the first point is the rôle of inflation, regard-
less of its cause. Once the cost of living starts to rise, the scramble for 
more intensifies since it then takes more in money terms just to hold 
one's own in real terms. 
In inflationary periods various groups are driven to devices such 
as cost-of-living « escalator » clauses to protect themselves from the 
rising cost of living. Unfortunately, however, resort to such devices may 
further aggravate the situation. 
While inflation and the rising cost of living explain much of the 
unrest among workers today, it would be misleading to suggest that they 
are the underlying problem. At worst they are symptoms or aggravating 
factors, or both. In terms of underlying causes, they reflect the absence 
of concensus on the distribution of the fruits of the économie system. 
This lack of consensus, rather than inflation and the rising cost of living, 
is surely a more fundamental cause of difficuky. 
The So-called « Pearson Formula » 
Adding fuel to the fire, at least until recently, was a séries of 
government-sanctioned settlements in some widely publieized disputes, 
including the Québec longshoremen and the seaway workers. Thèse 
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settlements ranged as high as 30% spread over two or three years. 
Although the seasonal nature of the work afforded a partial rationale for 
the abnormally high levels of thèse settlements, the public at large was 
left with the impression that expediency was the main criterion of 
government intervention. This impression was aggravated by faulty 
reporting in the mass média as to the exact nature of the settlements 
that emerged. The essential point is that although government inter-
vention may hâve been unavoidable, its results encouraged a wide 
variety of groups to adopt extravagant bargaining demands in the hope 
of similarly benefiting from benevolent government intervention. 
Job Insecurity 
Another cause of récent labour militancy has been warranted or 
unwarrented concern us over job security. Publicly, the greatest amount 
of concern has been expressed about outright displacement. Such fears 
are bound to dominate the thinking of low seniority workers, particu-
larly during an économie downturn. During the severe unemployment 
of the late 50's, for example, workers became particularly concerned 
about automation and other causes of displacement. Lacking bar-
gaining power because of the économie downturn, unions then could 
do relatively Iittle to protect their members. This left in its wake 
concerns which continue to corne to the surface even after the problem 
has lessened in significance. 
Today fear of outright displacement is not necessarily the critical 
issue. Often the more basic concern is the very thought of adjustment, 
even when it is not likely to give rise to external displacement. Espe-
cially among older and less educated workers there is a marked incli-
nation to favour the status quo. They hâve been repeatedly reminded 
ci their disadvantages in an âge of rising skill requirements and they 
readily support union demands for their protection. 
Management Secretiveness 
Job insecurity breeds suspicion and makes workers susceptible to 
rumours. An employées réputation for taking sudden unilatéral action 
which affects his employées is bound to earn him ill will and generate 
discontent. Intensified worker anxiety adds to the pressure upon unions 
to win the job security safeguards they are demanding. 
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The Rigidity of the Collective Agreement in 
the Face of Changing Working Conditions 
A collective agreement, in Canadian law, must be for a fixed period, 
generally at least one year. During the currency of the agreement, its 
terms and conditions can only be revised by consent of the parties. 
However, while the threat of strike or lockout is a spur to negotiations 
leading up to the création of a contract, no such threat can be made by 
either party during discussions over its possible mid-term revision. 
Strikes are outlawed for the duration of the agreement. Thus, it is 
unlikely that an employer will consent to changes in the agreement, 
even though requested changes might reflect the pressures of changing 
working conditions in the plant. 
One possible alternative would be for the parties to commit to an 
impartial arbitrator the job of amending the agreement to ensure that 
its terms are brought into line with changes which occur from time to 
time in techhnology or corporate structure. However, agreements almost 
never contain such a provision, and the law merely requires that the 
arbitrator be empowered to deal with « the interprétation, application, 
or alleged violation » of the agreement. Therefore, if a new process 
is introduced into the plant, the union's only recourse is to demonstrate 
that such action by management violâtes the terms of the agreement. 
If a collective agreement merely provides that employées performing 
certain duties are to be paid at a specified rate, then upon introduction 
cf a change, which requires the performance of a new range of duties, 
the company may unilaterally fix the new rates for those duties. Con-
sequently, in such a situation, the union is powerless to stop a possible 
érosion of its hard-won wage structure. Only if an arbitrator is prepared 
to impose upon management an obligation to honour implied under-
takings as well as the express language of the agreement can he give 
the union a remedy. 
Few Canadian arbitrators are prepared to adopt the widespread 
American view that such implications can be made. No Canadian boards 
hâve yet adopted even the minimal requirement that an employer 
bargain with the union over the possible effects of technological change 
in an effort to minimize worker dislocation. The majority view amongst 
Canadian arbitrators is the « residual rights » theory, which reserves 
to management ail of the rights it enjoyed before the advent of collective 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN CANADA : A DIAGNOSIS OF RÉCENT... 251 
bargaining, except those which are specifically surrendered in the 
express language of the collective agreement. 
Whatever its merits, this doctrine has lessened the value of the 
arbitration process as an administrative safety valve, and has reduced 
organized labour's faith in it. We do not now propose to explore the 
merits of the residual rights doctrine, as opposed to the alternative 
suggested by Mr. Justice Freedman in his Inquiry into Run-throughs on 
the Canadian National Railways. Suffice it to say that while the pre-
vailing practice may seem to be sound conventional légal doctrine, and 
to favour management, it may, for those very reasons, be an important 
factor in aggravating worker restiveness. 
When workers fear change, and find that their union is unable to 
take effective steps to protect their position until the reopening of the 
contract, they may become quite disillusioned. Frustrated, but not 
powerless, they may be tempted to take matters into their own hands, 
in défiance of both unions and employers. They may try to win by an 
unlawful strike what they cannot achieve through légal remédies. 
The Shifting Centres of Power in Union and Management 
The problems stemming from the shifting centres of power in union 
and management can be examined at two levels. First there are diffi-
culties resulting from centralized bargaining arrangements in which the 
interests of local unions are submerged in some kind of Consolidated 
negotiating procédure. Second, there are problems that can occur solely 
vvithin large local unions as the administration of the collective agree-
ment becomes more centralized. Less attention has been paid to the 
latter than to the former problem and we will therefore begin with it. 
There was a rime when organized labour wanted to commit the 
collective agreement to writing and management was reluctant to do so. 
However, as written agreements became commonplace, management 
learned to live with them. Today the written agreement is manage-
ments Maginot Line, defended with vigour against a union adversary 
whose tactic is to flow around the fixed positions of the written word, 
and to draw strength from tacit understandings and customs. 
This brings us to the source of the problem. As has been noted, 
failing agreement on the meaning of the collective agreement, the 
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parties are forced to resort to arbitration. Both sides hâve leamed that 
arbitrators give a great deal of weight to past practice, at least in the 
event of ambiguity in the language of the agreement. From manage-
ment^ point of view, this means that if it wants to protect its interests, 
it must insure that none of its supervisors are setting précédents which 
could prove harmful in arbitration, To protect itself from union 
attempts to establish such précédents, management has frequently been 
driven to strip its first line supervisors of the power to make any signi-
ficant contract interprétations lest they concède something they should 
not. Under thèse circumstances, it does not take long for the union 
steward (and ultimately the union members) involved to discover that 
lower-level management lacks the power to settle their grievances. In 
large organizations the delays which can resuit from more centralized 
handling of such problems can easily lead to a frustrating accumulation 
of unresolved issues. The conséquent tensions may cause the workers 
affected to take matters into their own hands. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, the same problem can 
affect local unions as a unit when they are caught up in multi-plant or 
multi-firm negotiations. Almost unavoidably there will be a tendency 
for the bargaining représentatives to concentrate on common or unit-
wide problems, to the neglect of local issues. If this neglect persists, 
local rebellions may be the resuit. 
Long-term Agreements 
Further complicating the situation in many instances is the practice 
of signing two, three, or even four years agreements. In ternis of stability 
in the relationship between the parties, a strong case can be made for 
lengthy agreements. The danger is that so many unforseen issues may 
accumulate during the terms of thèse agreements that it will be very 
difficult to satisfy the pent-up demands of the members in the next 
round of negotiations. In effect, they will demand both catch-up con-
cessions and guarantees against further frustration during the new 
agreement, which may put unbearable pressures on both union and 
management. 
Inexpérience in Bargaining 
In some situations, unrest is the product of inexpérience with col-
lective bargaining. Newly-organized groups of workers may hâve 
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nnrealistic expectations about the potential of concerted action to solve 
their problems, producing an unhealthy combination of naivete and 
strike-happiness. This appears to be particularly true of the profes-
sional and government employées who are just beginning to taste the 
fruits of their combined économie power. Clearly the problem is further 
compounded when their inexpérience is matched by a similar lack of 
expérience on the other side of the bargaining table. 
The Influx of Young People 
Related to the previous point is the influence of the rising numbers 
of young people entering the labour force. In contrast to earlier génér-
ations, thèse young people hâve born in a period of sustained prosperity, 
are better educated, are more impatient for the good things of life, are 
unintimidated by the expérience of the dépression, and are generally 
more skeptical of the values of their elders and of the need to respect 
authority. Unschooled in the traditions of trade unionism and collective 
bargaining unappreciative, perhaps unaware, of their past accomplish-
ments and eager to share in their purported benefits, their impact is 
bound to be unsettling to say the least. 
Factors Internai to the Labour Movement 
In addition to the factors already cited, there are a number of 
other forces at work that are largely internai to the labour movement. 
One of the most critical of thèse is the problem of communications 
within unions. Some of the larger labour organizations appear to be 
having a great deal of difficulty in bridging the gap between the 
leadership and the membership. This can become a particularly acute 
problem where union leaders participate in summit meetings with their 
opposite numbers from management. Occasionnally the resuit has been 
a crisis of confidence which has jeopardized existing bargaining arran-
gements in some industries. This, in turn, has sometimes forced unions 
and management to abandon their familiar and successful bargaining 
habits in order to corne to grips with problems within the new politieal 
framework. 
Related to the communications problem is the increasing difficulty 
which unions are having in reconciling the competing interests of their 
members. In some unions this is exemplified by a widening conflict 
of interest between skilled tradesmen and unskilled workers. In others 
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it is manifested in a « conflict of générations», with younger workers 
tending to want more in their weekly pay chèques, and older workers 
favouring increased pension plans and other fringe benefits. Unions 
hâve always had to engage in a great deal of « internai collective 
bargaining » prior to and during their extemal collective bargaining 
with management. If reconciliation of the competing interests within 
the union is difficult, reconciliation with management becomes doubly 
so. 
Inter- and intra-union rivalry aggravâtes the situation in many cases. 
Inter-union rivalry has been particularly severe in Québec, but it is also 
évident that unions try to outdo each other, at least at the bargaining 
table, in other parts of the country. Wage parity with the United States 
has now become a focal point for this kind of inter-union compétition. 
Perhaps more prévalent, particularly outside Québec, however, is intra-
union factionalism. Although the left-wing faction is weaker in many 
unions than it was in the past, there are still the « ins » and « outs » 
vying for power particularly at the local union level. 
Further aggravating the situation in many unions is the présence 
of the so-called « young turks », some of whom are eager aspirants to 
full-time union office. In the past when unions were growing more 
rapidly, new talent could be absorbed into the hierarchy. Now there 
are fewer openings and would-be leaders are driven to conclude that 
the path upward leads over the bodies of the incumbents. There is also 
the problem posed by younger members who do not take the union very 
seriously and often look upon the possibility of a strike as something of 
a lark. Both groups represent a difficult political challenge to esta-
blished union officers, who are compelled to assume a posture of public 
responsibility, while nurturing within the union an image of personal 
militancy. 
Lack of Satisfaction of Higher Order Needs 
Earlier it was argued that the demand for a greater share of the 
fruits of our économie System is a major cause of worker discontent. 
At the same time it should be noted that material demands can become 
secondary and be replaced in terms of primacy by certain higher order 
needs. Given satisfaction of their basic physical needs, workers may 
begin to désire such things as job satisfaction and self-respect. Where 
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their work is inherently routine and monotonous, meeting thèse desires 
may not be compatible with efficiency. For a time employers may be 
able to buy off the resulting frustrations through higher wages and 
fringe benefits, but at some point this may not suffice. Ultimately, 
worker malaise may find expression in some act of wilful self-assertion, 
such as deliberate absenteeism, insubordination, or wildcat strikes. 
Rising Educational Levels 
The average level of éducation in the labour force is steadily in-
creasing. This could be having a number of effects on attitudes which 
are relevant to the présent discussion. In the first place workers* expect-
ations may be raised, both in a material sensé and in terms of the higher 
order needs to which référence has just been made. Second, workers 
may be more aware of the gênerai prosperity that surrounds them, of 
the high profits of some of the firms for which they work, and of their 
enhanced bargaining power in a period of prosperity. Third, increased 
educational opportunities may divert the most intelligent and capable 
members of the work force away from the factory into « white collar » 
occupations, thus diluting the indigenous stock of potential leaders in 
the plant. Where a génération ago union office might be one of the 
few outlets for a bright youngster who was obliged to leave school 
prematurely, and to go to work, today's educational opportunities equip 
such persons for many other rôles. 
Full Employment 
The existence of full, even over-full, employment is not to be mini-
mized in explaining the récent militancy of union members. When a 
striking union has difficulty mustering members to man its picket lines 
— as has happened in some récent cases — it is clear that the workers 
hâve temporary employment elsewhere, and hâve nothing to lose and 
everything to gain by « striking » against their regular employer. Union 
leaders themselves hâve been embarrassed by the availability of alter-
native employment during a strike; on occasion, workers hâve refused 
to accept an employées offer of a substantial increase because they 
are under no real pressure to see the strike draw to a close. 
The Fruits of Militancy 
One of the most obvious reasons for continuing militancy among 
union members is that it pays. In numerous récent cases, for example, 
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workers hâve discovered that after they hâve turned down a company 
offer, their leaders are able to extract further concessions. Haviing once 
evperienced the success of this tactic, the temptation to use it regularly 
is well-nigh irrésistible. As well, other workers are encouraged to 
simulate intransigence in the hope of extracting more enticing offers 
from their employer. 
The Rôle of Management 
It would be easy to enumerate various management practices which 
contribute to worker discontent and to stress the need for improvement 
in thèse practices. Already mentioned, for example, has been the adverse 
effect which managements failure to give advance warning about 
planned changes can hâve on workers' attitudes. Without minimizing 
the importance of improving managerial techniques, it would seem 
more useful to emphasize how management is unwittingly but clearly 
playing into the hands of the more militant éléments within the ranks 
of union members. 
In the last section it was noted that one of the factors which helps 
to explain continued rank and file union militancy is the fact that it is 
yielding results. This is true in many instances because management 
is buckling under pressure, instead of standing firm. Sometimes this is 
due to the seeming inability of firms in the same industry to band 
together for collective bargaining purposes. Sometimes it is due to the 
compétitive position of a single firm. In virtually ail cases, manage-
ments lack of résolve appears to reflect a decidely short-run view of 
the stakes involved. 
In ternis of expediency, it is quite understandable that management 
should often attempt to buy peace, especially when rank and file mili-
tancy is channelled through formai union action. However, this policy 
of appeasement is dangerous when worker resentment is being directed 
as much against the union as against management. Not surprisingly, 
in this kind of situation, union officiais would often like to see manage-
ment stand firm. Where rank and file members are defying their leaders 
and management capitulâtes in the face of their pressure, the union and 
its leadership can be so undermined as to completely upset the labour-
management relationship. Moreover, management behaviour of this 
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kind — regardless of its motivation — clearly invites a répétition of 
membership défiance in the future. 
Other causes could doubtless be added to the catalogue of factors 
we hâve cited in our attempt to explain the increased militancy of rank 
and file union members. One possible addition which cornes readily 
to mind, for example, is the effect which outside criticisms of the labour 
movement could be having on its membership. Conceivably such 
criticism, especially when directed at alleged lack of union effectiveness, 
might induce union members to demand more of their leaders. However, 
this and other potential causes of rank and file restiveness do not in 
our opinion approach in gênerai significance the sixteen factors we 
hâve examined. 
EXPLAINING INCREASED LABOUR DÉFIANCE OF THE LAW 
We turn next to a question, the answers to which involve exami-
nation of societal values of the highest importance. Why is it that union 
militancy has not been expressed through lawful processes which are 
available to employées to redress their grievances and to advance or 
protect their économie position ? 
Labour lawlessness must, first, be placed in context. A distinguished 
jurist, J.C. McRuer, formerly Chief Justice of the High Court of Ontario, 
has said recently: 
I challenge the premise that the ordinary man on the street has less 
respect for justice today than he had fifty years ago. Our forefathers 
too often believed in vigourously defending laws and a social order 
that had one quality of justice for the powerful and another quality 
of justice for the weak... I am prepared to admit that there is a 
declining respect for many laws. I am not prepared to admit there is 
a declining respect for law. If there is a declining respect for law, 
legislators, lawyers and judges hâve failed to develop just laws and 
just procédures appropriate to the social changes brought about by 
the scientific developments of this century... 
In the view of a man who has lived his life in the law, it is a passion 
for justice which has, in a broad sensé, often led to disrespect for laws. 
This passion, in its most éloquent form, is exemplified by the campaign 
of civil disobedience waged by those who are protesting against racial 
injustice and what they conceive to be an immoral foreign policy. The 
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civil rights movement made « lawlessness » a badge of honour, worn 
with pride by those who vvere prepared to face fines and imprisonment 
rather than to abide injustice. 
The new respectability of lawlessness, however, is premised upon 
a belief that the légal order is not a just order. Whether this is a sim-
plistic view of Canadian labour relations law is a matter for debate. 
But the real facts of the matter are less relevant in terms of explaining 
labour lawlessness than the widespread conviction of unionists that they 
hâve little to gain and much to lose if they comply with the law. 
To the extent that genuine grievances do exist, thèse must be 
recognized if labour is to be persuaded to change its view. Perhaps 
the least controversial of thèse complaints relates to the problem of 
delay. While delays are found in many areas throughout our légal 
system, the fast-moving nature of industrial relations makes expeditious 
handling of labour problems particularly urgent. Expérience appears 
to be least satisfactory in conciliation and arbitration. 
Many criticisms hâve also been made of our contemporary tech-
niques of regulating picketing. Quite apart from the merits of particular 
cases, the statistical fact that the great majority of injunctions sought 
are actually granted, in and of itself raises a presumption of unfairness 
in the minds of unionists. To non-labour critics of the labour injunction, 
procédural abuses at least seem to call for substantial reforrns. The 
appearance of fairness is dissipated — to some extent unavoidably so 
— by the short notice required to be given prior to a hearing, the 
practical impossibility of making full answer and defence, the peremp-
tory nature of the hearings, and the virtual unavailability of appeal. 
Equally perplexing to the uncommitted observer, is the apparent mani-
pulation of jurisprudential concepts and disregard of traditional strictu-
res on the use of the court's injunctive power. 
On the crédit side, for those concerned with the fairness of the 
courts, is the récent démise of the ex parte injunction and signs of a 
trend towards more overt reliance by judges upon législative policies 
as the basis for their décisions. 
However the débits and the crédits may balance out, the most 
unfortunate development is that the confidence of labour in the fairness 
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of the judiciary lias been seriously undermined. ït bas been undermined 
scmetimes by the cynical and suggestive remarks of eritics and sometimes 
by self-incriminating judicial utterances. Consider, for example, such 
exceptional but gratuitous statements as: 
Therefore, the right, if there be such a right, of the (union) to 
engage in secondary pickting of the . . . premises must give way to 
the . . . right to trade ; the former, assuming it to be a légal right, 
is exercised for the benefit if a particular class only while the latter 
is a right far more fundamental and of far greater importance, in my 
view, as cne which in its exercise affects and is for the benefit of 
the community at large. 
or, again: 
In discussing the conduct of union members it may not be amiss to 
recognize that a high percentage of unions are dominated by persons 
from another State whose basic concept of law, order, good conduct 
and labour relations are not necessarily ours, but whose control seems 
almost to be absolute. 
Beyond thèse infrequent fut blatant examples of judicial antipathy 
towards labour, there is the subtler, yet more important, fact that légal 
doctrines developed and administered by courts are often rigid and 
unresponsive to the needs and problems of a collective bargaining 
régime. For example, the abiliry of an employer, under présent Cana-
dian law, to undermine the structure of a collective bargaining relation-
ship by the institution of technological change, or by relocation of the 
plant, lias shaken the confidence of unions in the law's evenhandedness. 
Even when the substance of the law clearly favours the position of the 
union, as for example in imposing a duty of good faith bargaining upon 
the employer, practical difficulties of enforcement sometimes seem to 
render the law a hollow mockery. 
The problems of enforcing the law produce a final explanation of 
why labour has turned to lawless techniques of satisfying its restless 
urges. Having lost confidence in the law, labour lias ceased to comply 
with it voluntarily. This raises the problem of how compliance can be 
enforced. Certainly, in the présent state of the law, it is difficult for 
an employer to secure monetary compensation through the regular courts 
for wrongs done by the union, although arbitration boards hâve on a 
number of occasions awarded employers damages because of union 
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îiability for unlawful strikes. The criminal process is slow, proof is 
difficult, and police and prosecuting authorities are reluctant to inter-
vene on behalf of either party to a labour dispute. Consequently, since 
be can neither prosecute nor sue for damages, the employer is driven 
to use the injunction as the primary technique of protecting his légal 
position. 
Of course, an injunction is not seîf-executing; it is merely a corn-
mand whose efficacy dépends on the willingness of those to whom it is 
addressed to obey it willingly, or on the ability of those who make the 
command to enforce it. Until recently, the mère issuance of the 
injunction was sufficient to secure an end to picketing presumably 
because unionists were then no more prepared to abandon respect for 
the law than most citizens. However, as this respect has waned, with 
decreasing confidence in the basic fairness of the courts, deliberate 
disobedience of the injunction has become more prévalent. Although 
those who disobey an injunction are liable to fine and imprisonment for 
contempt of court, it seems unlikely that such sanctions can be com-
pletely effective. First, there is the practical problem of enforcement: 
large numbers of contemnors must be identified and brought to court, 
spécifie allégations must be made and proved against each, jails must be 
found to accommodate those found guilty, or extended proceedings 
taken to recover unpaid fines. The second problem is even greater: 
for a unionist who deliberately courts martyrdom, fines and jail are 
not a form of punishment but rather the veiy thing he seeks. If the 
situation détériorâtes sufficiently a government may feel itself confronted 
by a dilemma from which it can only escape by reform of the law: 
vigorous enforcement of injunctions may produce a backlash at the 
poils; non-enf or cernent may undermine the credibility of the whole 
judicila process. To avoid this dilemma, the Government of Ontario 
has appointed a Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes. 
Whether its report will ultimately stimulate effective reform of the law 
remains to be seen. 
Summory and Conclusions 
The few insights planted throughout this paper are obviously in-
adéquate to produce a bountiful crop of solutions. Indeed if we were 
to suggest plausible solutions we woulcl be preempting the function of 
a swarm of task forces, labour-management committees and royal com-
missions. Instead, we will conclude by reviewing our major thesis, and 
by speculating about some of its implications. 
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We hâve tried to describe the nature of récent industrial unrest in 
Canada, with particular référence to two of its most disturbing features, 
rank and file militancy and labour défiance of the law. In each case, 
we hâve identified a variety of causes, but we wish to reiterate that, 
in a given situation, thèse causes may be présent in varying degrees. 
We hâve therefore studiously avoided any suggestion that there is a 
monolithic explanation for thèse phenomena. 
Before concluding, however, we would like to pass beyond this 
disclaimer in order to make several more pointed observations. To 
begin with we should make it clear that to a degree we welcome the 
militancy recently displayed by rank and file union members. While 
this militancy obviously has its irresponsible and disturbing aspects, it 
can be viewed in a positive light as well. At least we hâve been reas-
sured that union members are still determined to govern their own 
affairs. From rime to time, they may hâve to reclaim the « collective » 
bargaining system as their own, if it is not to become the property of 
a labour bureaucracy. Although this self-assertion by the rank and file 
may produce more militancy and conflict than we are accustomed to, 
it is a price we must pay for the contribution which collective bargain-
ing makes both to the maintenance of our free enterprise system on the 
économie side, and to our démocratie system on the political side. 
The basic challenge in the long run is for unions to remain at one 
and the same time both démocratie — in the sensé of being responsive 
to the wishes of their members — and responsible — in the sensé of 
being able to commit themselves contractually and otherwise to em-
ployer and to society at large. Over the décades unions hâve done a 
commendable job of reconciling the vaiious obligations which thèse 
twin pressures impose upon them. From time to time, however, undue 
déférence may seem to be paid to one of thèse duties rather than to the 
other. It is at times such as this that we need to retain perspective. 
The seductive appeal of législation is almost irrésistible but, to the extent 
possible, dalliance should précède consummation. There is a real risk 
that a crisis stature will compound our problems rather than résolve 
them. 
In conclusion, we would make one final point. As never before 
unions and their leaders are functioning as managers of discontent. 
Their constraints are more rigid and inflexible, their mandate more 
tenuous, than is gênerally appreciated. They need a reasonable freedom 
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from external pressure if they are not to become entirely the mère mes-
sengers of the discontented. Thus, if union leaders are to do what is 
vesponsible in the long run, they may hâve to do what seems îxrespon-
sible in the short run, or the membership will dépose them. If this 
seems to be a choice of evils, we would only add that with collective 
bargaining, as with many démocratie institutions, a perverse faith in the 
rJtimate capabilities of men may be our only hope — that, and the 
absence of an acceptable alternative. 
LE MALAISE INDUSTRIEL AU CANADA: UN DIAGNOSTIC 
DE LA RÉCENTE EXPÉRIENCE 
U N E PERSPECTIVE DU MALAISE INDUSTRIEL AU CANADA 
Nous pouvons croire au premier abord que le Canada, comme les autres 
sociétés industrielles libres, a subi la plupart des grandes manifestations du malaise 
industriel durant les années de croissance économique. Avant de vérifier la vérité 
de cette croyance, nous nous pencherons sur les deux caractéristiques de la pré-
sente vague de malaise qui semble avoir des causas très complexes : 
1.—le militantisme spontané des ouvriers du rang ; 
2.—le mépris accru de la loi de la part des syndicats. 
Mais nous pourrions peut-être dire que ces deux traits sont la rançon de la 
prospérité. 
L E SYNDICALISME, LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE, 
LE DROIT ET LES AVOCATS DU TRAVAIL 
Le syndicalisme est sans contredit une partie essentielle de l'organisation indus-
trielle d'une société libre. C'est en fait un participant indispensable au processus 
de la négociation collective. Cependant on ne considère trop souvent que le rôle 
proprement économique du syndicat, alors que sa plus grande contribution peut 
aussi bien être dans d'autres domaines. 
Si nous considérons le point de vue légal, nous devons noter que le rôle du 
droit en relations industrielles n'est ni statique ni inévitable. Nos lois du travail 
soutiennent ce désir que la négociation collective soit une technique pour régula-
riser les relations industrielles en tentant de balancer le pouvoir entre les deux 
parties à la négociation. Mais alors que les lois du travail reflètent une pensée 
contemporaine, la jurisprudence représente un consensus social plus vieux basé 
sur des divergences de vues au sujet des politiques publiques et des propriétés 
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de la négociation collective. Les politiques plus vieilles penchent vers la protection 
des entrepreneurs contre l'interférence syndicale alors que la législation contempo-
raine prone la protection de la négociation collective contre l'hostilité des em-
ployeurs. 
Tout ceci nous amène à faire quelques remarques sur le rôle de l'avocat en 
relations industrielles. Même si l'esprit parfois trop juridique des avocats a con-
tribué à empoisonner les relations de travail, ils peuvent, et le font de plus en 
plus, apporter une contribution à la fois constructive et créative. 
LES CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA RECENTE VAGUE 
DE M ALAISE INDUSTRIEL 
Pour mieux analyser la récente vague de malaise industriel au Canada, nous 
devons d'abord identifier plus à fond ses caractéristiques. En plus des deux traits 
généraux déjà mentionnés, il y en a au moins six autres spécifiques à considérer : 
1.—le haut taux de roulement des vieux chefs syndicaux ; 
2.—le refus des membres de ratifier les conventions collectives ; 
3.—les grèves sauvages ; 
4.—les rivalités inter-syndicales ; 
5.—la syndicalisation de nouveaux secteurs de l'économie ; 
6.—le temps perdu dû aux grèves. 
ANALYSE DE LA PRÉSENTE VAGUE DE MALAISE INDUSTRIEL 
Dans les lignes qui suivent, nous porterons d'abord notre attention sur les 
causes du militantisme ouvrier pour ensuite considérer les raisons du mépris qu'ont 
les syndicats de l'ordre et de la loi. 
a) Explication de militantisme des ouvriers du rang 
1.—la tendance à toujours demander plus dans notre société d'abondance; 
2.—l'inflation et l'élévation du coût de la vie ; 
3.—la soi-disant formule Pearson ; 
4.—l'insécurité d'emploi ; 
5.—le caractère cachotier du patronat ; 
6.—la rigidité de la convention collective face aux changements dans les 
conditions de travail ; 
7.—le changement des centres de pouvoir syndicaux et patronaux ; 
8.—les accords à long terme ; 
9.—le manque d'expérience en négociation collective ; 
10.—la croissance du nombre des jeunes membres ; 
11.—les facteurs internes au mouvement ouvrier ; 
12.—le manque de satisfaction des besoins supérieurs ; 
13.—l'élévation du niveau d'éducation ; 
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14.—le plein emploi ; 
15.—les fruits du militantisme ; 
16.—le rôle de la direction. 
b) Explication du mépris accru des syndicats face à la loi 
Ce mépris de la loi doit être placé dans son contexte. Les syndicalistes ont 
la fenne conviction qu'ils ont peu à gagner et beaucoup à perdre en se soumettant 
à la loi. Il en serait ainsi dans le cas des délais, piquetages et des injonctions. 
Mais il reste que les doctrines développées et administrées par les cours de 
justice sont souvent rigides et ne répondent pas aux besoins et aux problèmes du 
régime de négociation collective. Ayant donc perdu confiance dans la loi., les syn-
dicats ont cessé de s'y soumettre. Ceci soulève une question à savoir comment 
peut-on retrouver la soumission d'antan ? Soit en appliquant la loi à la lettre ou, 
si cela s'avère inutile, la changer tout simplement. 
CONCLUSION 
Nous ne prétendons pas avoir apporté une foule de solutions aux problèmes 
existants. Nous avons seulement tenté de décrire la nature du récent malaise 
industriel au Canada. Le défi de longue période pour les syndicats serait alors de 
demeurer à la fois démocratique et responsable. 
UNE POLITIQUE GLOBALE DE MAIN-D'OEUVRE ? 
Une politique globale de main-d'œuvre (ANDRE RAYNAULD). Nature et contenu 
d'une politique globale de main-d'oeuvre (ROLAND PARENTEAU) ; Commentaires 
(JEAN-GERIN LAJOIE), (FRANÇOIS CLEYN). Mise en oeuvre d'une politique glo-
bale de main-d'oeuvre (LAURENT BELANGER); Commentaires (MARCEL PEPIN), 
(JEAN BRUNELLE). Politique de main-d'oeuvre et négociation collective (PIERRE-
PAUL PROULX). Politique fédérale et politique provinciale de main-d'œuvre — 
Table ronde (PIERRE-F. COTE), (YVES DUBE), (MARCEL GUAY). Croissance éco-
nomique et politique de main-d'oeuvre (LOUIS COUILLARD). 
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